Both lectures will take place at The University of Auckland in the Owen G Glenn Building, Room OGGB 5. This is the new Business School in Grafton Road.

Nearby parking is available in the basement of the Owen G Glenn Building off Grafton Rd at $4 per hour.

By Ray Bradley, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, The University of Auckland and Simon Fraser University.

Abstract
In his essay "Memorial Service" (1922), H. L. Mencken named 170 heathen gods, many of whom were theoretically omnipotent, omniscient, and immortal, all of whom were worshipped by millions, and all of whom are dead. What caused their demise? Persecution, war, genocide, and the like. Plus the dawning recognition that the case for their survival was intellectually and morally insupportable. How do the revealed gods of monotheism--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--fare on these two counts? Poorly. Many would say that they too will therefore go to their graves. And deserve to.
Yet Science is now being recruited to resuscitate the God of Christianity in particular. Probabilistic arguments for intelligent design and fine-tuning are all the rage. Are these arguments any good? And how would a designer/creator god fare on the count of Morality?
I will conduct my arguments for atheism within the framework of a three-fold distinction, that between Scientific Naturalism, Biblical Supernaturalism, and Non-biblical Supernaturalism (theistic and deistic). Of these three accounts of the gods, I'll argue, only the first is credible.

By Robert Nola, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Auckland.

Abstract
Many societies are becoming more diverse in the religious beliefs and practices of their citizens. And in many the absence of any religious belief whatever is on the increase. In these circumstances, many people claim that we should respect the religious beliefs of others. But I will argue, to the contrary, that it is tolerance rather than respect that we all should show for the beliefs of others, and that this holds whether those beliefs are religious or nonreligious. Non-believers, especially atheists, argue that we cannot sensibly respect the non-existent. On different grounds some believers in the existence of God may accord God little respect (perhaps on the basis of an argument arising from the problem of evil). In the lecture a distinction is drawn between six different kinds of respect. The phenomenon of what will be called "respect creep" is also noted in which the criteria of respect are illegitimately set too high and binding on others. In addition six different categories of "objects" of respect are distinguished. Combining the kinds and objects of respect gives at least 36 possibilities to consider! Here only a few will be examined, in particular whether or not it makes sense to give respect to propositional contents, for example the claims of religious doctrines. Also highlighted is the difference between two distinct kinds of "object": according respect to a person's right to religious beliefs as distinct to according respect to the belief contents themselves (if that makes sense). It is also noted that not according respect to some X does not entail disrespect of X; so the grounds for disrespect need to be considered separately. Finally it is shown that the above distinctions accord well with a certain conception of tolerance in which there a combination of respect for the rights and liberties of people to their beliefs along with an absence of respect reflected through strong objections to, and criticisms of, those beliefs.

The lecture series is under the sponsorship of the Philosophy Department of The University of Auckland, and the Philosophy Department of Monash University as part of their Australasian Philosophy Project.